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Abstract 
Reputation systems aim to reduce the risk of loss due to 
untrustworthy participants. This loss is aggravated by dishonest 
advisors trying to pollute the e-market environment for their self-
interest. A major task of a reputation system is to promote and 
encourage advisors who repeatedly respond with fair advice and 
to apply an opinion filtering or honesty checking mechanism to 
detect and resist dishonest advisors. This paper provides a 
dynamic approach to compute the aggregated shared reputation 
component by filtering out unfair advice and then generating the 
aggregated shared reputation value. The proposed approach is 
dynamic in nature as it is sensitive to the behaviour of advisors, 
value of the current transaction and encourages the cooperation 
among buyers as advisors. It provides incentive to honest 
advisors in lieu of repeated sharing of honest opinion by 
increasing the weight of their opinion and by making the increase 
in the reputation of honest advisors monotonically proportional 
to the value of a transaction.  
Keywords: Reputation, Reinforcement Learning, e-market, 
Trustworthiness. 
1. Introduction 
The burst in Internet connectivity around the globe has 
resulted in the enormous increase in the popularity of e-
commerce for online buying and selling. This next 
generation technique of online business and consumer 
behaviour has associated risks as it relies on cooperative 
user behaviour [7]. Ensuring cooperative behaviour among 
participants is a challenging task undertaken by online 
reputation systems given the facts that participating users 
are autonomous and self-interested, behaving only in their 
best interests. In the design of a robust reputation system, 
different reputation management processes like collection 
and aggregation of reputation should require safeguarding 
against a variety of threats like biased/unfair opinions due 
to collusion between the advisor, other buyers and target 
seller agent.  
Buyer agents that provide opinions about a target seller 
agent play a vital role in the success of a reputation system 
because based on their opinion the value of shared 
reputation component will be computed.  A false opinion 
may result in future transactions with untrustworthy seller 
agent as the source buyer agent that has requested for 
advice might be misinformed and may form a wrong 
assessment of the target agents‟ reputation [5]. Hence 
opinions with hidden motives and malicious intentions can 
harm reputation systems by artificially enhancing the 
reputation of malicious participants or by artificially 
lowering the reputation of honest participants resulting 
into possible failure of the system. Therefore, mechanisms 
to filter out dishonest advice are fundamental part of any 
reputation sharing strategy, and are an integral part of the 
success of any online reputation system.   
One of the major objectives of a reputation system is to 
promote and encourage advisors who provide fair advice 
for enhancing trustworthiness among participants in the e-
market environment. An honest opinion helps in 
narrowing the gap between the shared reputation score and 
the actual trustworthiness of the target agent under 
consideration.  Reputation systems aggregate opinions 
from other community members playing the same role, say 
buyers role, in a meaningful way to compute the peer‟s 
reputation. The trade-off in the opinion gathering process 
is between the efficiency of using available reputation 
information and vulnerability to false ratings and deceitful 
behaviour.  A robust reputation system should be resistant 
to the participants‟ efforts who try to maliciously tamper 
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with reputation information by presenting false 
information to reputation seekers. Various rating 
misbehaviour that are observed during the opinion 
gathering process are listed below. 
 Individual Unfair Ratings: A particular advisor 
provides unfairly high or low ratings without 
collaborating with other agents. This type of rating 
may result from advisors‟ personality, carelessness or 
randomness in rating behaviour [3, 20].  
 Collaborative Unfair Ratings: A group of agents 
collude to provide unfairly high or low ratings to boost 
or downgrade the overall rating of the target agent [1, 
2, 10, 12, 19, 20]. Two subtypes of collaborative unfair 
ratings are known as Ballot Stuffing (BS) and Bad 
Mouthing (BM). In BS, a number of buyers give 
inflated reputation ratings of the target seller agent with 
the purpose to collectively boost the reputation of the 
target agent at the raters‟ end by effectively launching 
a good reputation attack. In BM, a number of buyers 
provide unfairly low reputation ratings of the target 
seller agent with the purpose to conspire against the 
target seller agent, thereby hurting its reputation. 
Compared with collaborative unfair ratings, individual 
unfair ratings usually cause much less damage [4]. First, 
individual high ratings and individual low ratings can 
cancel out each other. Second, the number of individual 
unfair ratings should be statistically much less than the 
number of normal ratings. Therefore, this paper 
concentrates on filtering out collaborative unfair ratings.   
This paper utilises Reinforcement learning (RL) for 
modeling the reputation of advisors.  RL is a machine 
learning technique that deals with what an agent should do 
in every state that it can be and how to map situations to 
action, in order to maximize the long term reward. The 
learner is not told which action to take, but instead must 
discover which actions yield the most reward by trying 
them. In some cases, actions may affect not only the 
immediate reward, but also all subsequent rewards. These 
two characteristics, i.e. trial-and-error search and delayed 
reward are most important distinguishing features of RL. 
The proposed model for sharing reputation of seller agents 
amongst buyer agents is based on the dynamic reputation 
model in e-market  [15, 16, 17, 18] in which the reputation 
of a seller agent is computed using reinforcement learning. 
Reputation of a participant in this model is composed of 
two components: Individual Reputation (IR) component 
and Shared Reputation (SR) component. Individual 
Reputation (IR) is based on the direct personal experience 
of the buyer with the seller, whereas Shared Reputation 
(SR) represents the advice/opinion of other buyer agents 
who have some experience of having previous transactions 
with the seller agent. This paper provides a strategy to 
share reputation of a seller agent (henceforth referred to as 
target seller agent) among buyer agents. It also deals with 
the problem of providing unfair reputation rating by a set 
of buyers in the role of advisors to the source buyer agent 
who has solicited opinions about a seller agents‟ reputation 
from other buyer agents in the e-market.  
The proposed methodology in this paper contains two key 
elements: filtering of unfair ratings and 
establishing/updating advisors‟ reputation. Filtering of 
unfair ratings involves getting rid of those opinions that do 
not appear to be trustworthy by virtue of being either 
artificially inflated or artificially reduced. The second key 
element is reputation establishment of the advisors, as an 
advisors‟ reputation that is based on its history of previous 
interactions reveal information about its past behaviour as 
an honest/dishonest advisor. Further, an expectation that 
the nature of its current advice will be visible in the future 
may deter moral hazard in the present, that hazard being 
the temptation to cheat or exert low effort [4] and would 
create an incentive to honestly perform up to its ability. 
Knowledge about the trustworthiness of advisors would 
reduce the influence of the untrustworthy advisors on the 
system by avoiding the advice of dis-reputed advisors. 
Further, as the unfair advice is filtered out, different 
reputation ratings of the target seller agent received as 
opinion from other buyer agents must be aggregated to 
form a single aggregated shared reputation component 
value. The advice from other buyers is filtered by using the 
concept of moment about an arbitrary point [8, 14] that 
compares the set of received opinions with the reputation 
value representing the actual individual experience of the 
source buyer agent. The proposed scheme provides  an 
incentive to honest advisors by allocating reputation to 
advisors for their honest opinions in the reputation sharing 
process and also by making weight of an advisors‟ opinion 
monotonically proportional to number and percentage of  
honest past opinions as a reward for successive fair 
opinions in an environment where honesty is at premium. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Various 
methods of sharing reputation in reputation models from 
the literature are presented in section 2. Section 3 presents 
a trust enhancing dynamic reputation sharing methodology 
among buyer agents. Section 4 comprises of a case study. 
The paper concludes with Section 5.  
2. Related Work 
Reputation models are an important component of e-
market, help building trust and elicit cooperation among 
loosely connected and geographically dispersed economic 
agents [13]. A number of research works from literature 
have recognized the importance of reputation management 
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in online systems and a number of solutions have been 
proposed to promote cooperation among agents for sharing 
of reputation information for a more accurate reputation 
computation. These models employ various strategies to 
filter out unfair/dishonest opinions as discussed ahead in 
this section.  
Beta Reputation System (BRS) [1] estimates reputation of 
seller agents by using a probabilistic approach using beta 
probability density functions. It combines the ratings of a 
seller agent being provided by multiple advisors by 
accumulating number of good ratings and number of bad 
ratings. To handle unfair opinions, BRS filter out ratings 
that are not in the majority among others by using Iterated 
Filtering approach. However, this approach is effective 
when majority of ratings are fair and it does not combine 
buyers‟ personal experience with the advisors‟ feedback. 
TRAVOS [19] is a trust and reputation model that models 
an agents‟ trust in a partner by taking into account past 
interactions. It deals with inaccurate reputation advice by 
first estimating the accuracy of the current reputation 
advice based on the number of past accurate and 
inaccurate advice. Then, it tries to adjust reputation advice 
according to its accuracy. However, TRAVOS assumes 
that sellers act consistently which may not be the case and 
further this model needs to go over an advisors past advice 
at each time when accuracy of the advice is to be 
estimated. For large number of advisors‟, managing vast 
amount of past advice is difficult.  
An incentive mechanism to reinforce truthful reports [9] 
proposes a wage based scheme to encourage 
trustworthiness among peers. It gives high incentive for 
satisfactory reports and low incentive for non satisfactory 
reports. But, this scheme does not verify the truthfulness of 
received information.  
A personalized approach for tackling unfair ratings [10] is 
suited for centralized reputation systems. To evaluate the 
advisors‟ trustworthiness, it uses a public and private 
reputation approach. It estimates advisors‟ credibility by 
using a probabilistic approach, and computes their 
trustworthiness based on their provided ratings.   
Designing adaptive buying agents [12] approach is based 
on interacting with reputed advisors and based on the 
perceived error, it tries to adjust the reputation given by 
the witnesses. But, this model is based on allocating 
negative reputation also, which is disadvantageous in case 
of lowly rated participants exiting and re-entering the e-
market with a fresh identity. 
Evaluating rater credibility or reputation [21] uses a 
majority rating scheme to dilute the effect of unfair ratings 
by using standard deviation of all reported ratings and by 
adjusting the credibility of a service rater based on its past 
behaviour. This scheme suffers from the same problem 
like other systems from literature [1, 10, 12, 19] that are 
based on the assumption that mean, variance or standard 
deviation of the reported opinions would lead to an 
accurate assessment of the target agents‟ reputation. But in 
case the number of reported opinions is not very large, it 
may happen that the actual reputation lies near to the either 
end of the range of reported opinions rather than  their 
mean. Moreover, predicting without the solid dependence 
on its own experience leads to a weak inference as far as 
accuracy of reputation is concerned. 
An evidential model [2] for reputation management to 
select the fair advice considers three types of deceptions: 
complementary, exaggerative positive and exaggerative 
negative opinions. It uses an exaggeration coefficient to 
differentiate between exaggerative and complementary 
deceptive agents. This model uses the deviation of the 
ratings given by advisors to differentiate between fair and 
unfair advice.  
Multi-Layer Cognitive Filtering [22] approach aggregates 
several parameters in computing the trustworthiness of 
advisors. It uses a two-layered filtering algorithm which 
first filters out neighbours with deceptive rating patterns 
and in the second layer it uses behavioural characteristics 
to cognitively derive actual intentions of the surviving 
agents of the previous layer.  
The next section describes the proposed model for sharing 
reputation of the target seller agent among buyer agents. 
This model is relatively dynamic as it computes the weight 
of an advisor based on the dynamically changing 
parameters of e-market, like the number and percentage of 
honest past opinions and, the value of transaction. The 
amount of change in advisors‟ reputation is based on the 
value of transaction to emphasize that honest advice in a 
large value transaction is more important as compared to a 
similar advice in a relatively small value transaction.  
3. Trust Enhancing Dynamic Reputation 
Sharing Model 
The goal of a reputation system in an agent oriented         
e-commerce is to develop trustworthiness or the degree to 
which one agent/party has confidence in another within the 
context of a given purpose or decision [11]. A reputation 
system must ensure that after a number of transactions, the 
market reaches an equilibrium state and dishonest agents 
are weeded out of the market. To discourage dishonest 
agents in the e-market, an efficient reputation sharing 
model must filter out dishonest advice and, at the same 
time must also provide some incentive to honest advisors 
to encourage sharing of trustworthy i.e. honest opinions 
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about reputation of others in an environment where all the 
participants are self interested. 
3.1 Overview   
The proposed strategy for sharing reputation of a seller 
among buyer agents is based on the reputation system in 
an e-market model [15, 16, 17, 18] having a set of buyers 
and sellers. In this model, sellers are divided into four 
categories, namely, reputed, non-reputed, dis-reputed and 
new sellers [16].  Buyers allocate reputation rating to 
sellers in the range [0,1]. At any given time t, a buyer 
preferably  selects  a  seller from the list of reputed sellers 
but in no case, it selects a dis-reputed seller [16]. Before 
purchasing a good, the buyer computes expected value of 
the good being offered  by each seller by using a dynamic 
seller selection strategy [17] and places an order to a seller 
that is offering the good with the highest expected value. 
After purchasing, once the buyer receives a good, it 
computes the actual value of that good. If actual value of 
the good is more than   its   expected  value, the buyer  
increases  the  seller‟s  individual   reputation   component; 
otherwise it decreases sellers‟ individual reputation. 
Further, the source buyer agent also solicits opinion from 
other reputed buyers‟ acting as advisors about the target 
seller agent and after filtering unfair advice it aggregates 
their opinions that form the shared reputation component. 
Finally, at time t+1, individual and shared reputations are 
combined to update overall reputation of the seller [16]. 
After the purchase of a good, individual reputation updated 
at time t+1 is based on overall reputation at time t to 
impress upon the fact that based on reinforcement 
learning, the updated overall reputation of a seller by a 
buyer at the end of previous transaction becomes the 
individual experience of that buyer agent in the next 
transaction.  In addition to a buyer allocating a reputation 
to a seller, after each transaction, a seller agent also 
allocates reputation rating to the buyer with the purpose to 
increase buyer-seller satisfaction [15]. This reputation 
model is relatively dynamic in nature as it is sensitive to 
the changing parameters of the e-market like the value of a 
transaction and the changing experience of buyer-seller 
pair in the e-market [15, 16, 17, 18].   
As depicted in Fig. 1, source buyer b requests for opinion 
from other buyer agents bi where   to obtain the 
reputation of the target seller agent s. After receiving the 
advice, it filters out dishonest advice and computes the 
weight of each opinion based on dynamically changing 
parameters like percentage and number of previous honest 
opinions from a particular buyer in the role of an advisor. 
It finally computes the aggregated shared opinion and 
updates  the reputation of the advisor based on whether the 
opinion was evaluated to be honest or not.   
 
Fig. 1 Dynamic Reputation Sharing Model 
There are certain issues in the process of collecting and 
aggregating opinion from advisors: buyers acting as 
advisors may provide unfair reputation of the target seller 
agent, buyers may not always be willing to share their 
opinion about the seller agent, so there should be some 
incentive for the honest advisors who are always ready to 
share their opinion with other buyer agents. Hence, before 
proceeding with an elaboration of how a group of advisors 
are selected, a possible desiderata that is important for an 
advisor is listed below. 
i. Transactional Experience: The opinion of those 
advisors would be more useful who have in-depth 
experience of the behaviour of the target seller agent in 
lieu of having participated in large number of 
transactions with the seller in the past.  
 
ii. Behaviour Familiarity: It is beneficial to take the 
service of a reputed advisor repeatedly as it leads to 
increase in confidence and reliability due to its 
promising behaviour of successively providing honest 
opinions in the past.  
 
iii. Reputation Computation Similarity: Advisors must 
compute the reputation of the target seller agent using 
the methodology similar to the one being adopted by 
the source buyer agent. This ensures that in the 
proposed dynamic reputation framework [8], after a 
transaction, all buyers compute the reputation of a 
seller using the same methodology [7, 8].  
 
iv. Ideally, advisors should be as close as possible to the 
source buyer agent in the network topology i.e. at a 
maximum distance of not more than few hops. But this 
requirement is in contradiction to the availability of 
advice from sufficient number of reputed advisors i.e. 
advisors who have a good experience of the target 
seller agent and have also shown largely honest 
behaviour in previous transactions. 
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3.2 A Dynamic Reputation Sharing Methodology   
As agents in an e-market are self-interested, they interact 
with each other to maximize their own goals. To ensure 
honest interaction amongst agents, a reputation system 
helps agents to estimate the trustworthiness of each other 
and choose the most reputable ones to interact with.  
However, a reputation system may be deceived by 
malicious agents that provide unfair advice for their 
personal gains. Hence, the problem of unfair ratings is 
fundamental and exists in almost every reputation system.  
The proposed methodology to take care of the problem of 
unfair ratings is composed of two components: filtering 
unfair advice and, computing the reputation of advisors 
that reflects the analysis of their past behaviour in pursuing 
the goal of staying away from dishonest advisors. One of 
the essential requirements of such a system is the presence 
of willing advisors to participate in the opinion sharing 
process. This requires some sort of incentive for advisors 
as an encouragement to share their advice with other 
buyers. The proposed scheme in this paper provides 
incentive to honest advisors from two perspectives: first by 
associating a reputation with buyers exclusively for their 
contribution in the reputation sharing process as advisors. 
Second, with each successive honest/satisfactory opinion, 
there is an increase in the weight of an advisor as a reward 
for successive fair opinions in an environment where 
honesty is at premium.  
The familiar folk theorem tells that cooperative behaviour 
can be sustained with infinite repetition and sufficient 
patient players [6]. This is possible in small societies 
where repeated and non-anonymous interaction is quite 
frequent, so that socially beneficial behaviour can develop. 
In this paper, the seeking of advice is restricted from a 
group of reputed advisors, which is a small group where 
entities have some knowledge of each other by virtue of 
their behaviour in previous transactions. This encourages 
cooperative and honest behaviour as compared to a large 
group of advisors with unknown identities.   
The advice from other buyers is filtered by using the 
concept of “moment about an arbitrary point” [14] that 
compares the set of received opinions with the actual 
individual experience of the source buyer agent. The 
"second moment" is widely used and measures the "width" 
(in a particular sense) of a set of points in one dimension, 
or in higher dimensions measures the shape of a cloud of 
points as it could be fit by an ellipsoid [8]. Instead of 
finding the mean, variance or standard deviation from 
within the set of opinion data, this paper computes the 
distance of the individual reputation from each shared 
opinion about the target sellers‟ reputation by finding the 
second moment about a point representing individual 
experience of the source buyer with the target seller agent. 
The second moment behaves just like variance but with 
respect to the individual experience of the source buyer 
agent. This is to emphasize the fact that reputation based 
on personal experience is a far more accurate representa-
tion of the accurate reputation value, from which the 
distance of the received opinions represented by the 
second moment is compared, in order to compute the 
maximum permissible error deviation that is acceptable for 
an opinion to be classified as honest. The set of opinions 
whose difference from the individual reputation is less 
than or equal to the value of second moment falls in the 
cluster of honest advice, and the opinions with difference 
more than the second moment falls in the cluster of dis-
honest advice. 
In this model, B represents the set of buyers; A represents 
the set of buyers in the role of advisors where A B; S 
represents the set of sellers and, G the set of goods. Let 
 [0,1) represents reputation rating of advisor bi  
at time t where i = 1,2,...,n;  represents reputation 
of seller s sent as opinion by advisor bi to the source buyer 
b; and   [0,1) represents aggregated shared 
reputation (SR) i.e. the aggregated value of the opinion of 
other buyers about target seller s. At time t+1, buyer b 
stores/remembers the reputation of all the advisors, with 
whom it interacted at time t in the past. Each buyer 
maintains four categories of advisors as defined below. 
(i)   :  Advisors in the reputed list of buyer b, i.e. 
, where advisor ,  is the 
reputation threshold of advisor bi for i=1,2,...,n for 
source buyer agent b and   . 
 
(ii)  :  Advisors in the non-reputed list of buyer b, i.e. 
where advisor   . 
 
 
(iii)  :  Advisors in the dis-reputed list of buyer b, i.e.  
 where ,  is the dis-
reputation threshold and . 
 
 
(iv)  : Advisors those are new to buyer b in the 
market, initially  A new advisor bi 
remains in this list until its reputation crosses the dis-
reputation threshold  .  
Let  be the minimum threshold on the number of advisors 
whose opinion is necessary before computing a consolida-
ted shared reputation rating of the target seller agent. This 
is done to add to the fairness of shared opinion component. 
Further, let b be the source buyer agent that requests for  
opinion about the past performance of the target seller 
agent s from other buyers at time t+1 and, in return, a 
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subset of advisors respond. The detailed methodology is 
divided into two parts and is elaborated  ahead. 
Part I: 
1. The source buyer agent b solicits opinion about the 
target seller agent s from the set of buyer agents who 
belong to its list of reputed advisors i.e. buyers who 
provided satisfactory opinions in the past interactions 
to buyer b. If the number of advisors sharing their 
opinion about the reputation of the target seller agent s 
falls below the minimum threshold for the number of 
advisors then the buyer b seeks opinion from the set of 
non-reputed advisors but in no case the buyer would 
choose a dis-reputed advisor. In addition, with a small 
probability ð, buyer b would solicit opinion from 
previously unknown advisors who would join the set of 
new advisors i.e. . Initially the value of ð is 1 
and it decreases over time to some minimum value 
defined by buyer b. 
2. Accept the advice from a subset of advisors bi  A for i 
=1,2,...,n, who respond with their opinion , that 
represents reputation of seller s sent as opinion by 
advisor bi to the buyer b. Ignore, if there is an opinion 
from any of the dis-reputed advisors.  
Part II:  
3. To filter out unfair opinions, find the second moment 
about the individual reputation value of the target seller 
agent to compute the maximum permissible deviation 
from the individual reputation rating. This is to ensure 
that opinions too diverging from its own experience 
about the target seller agent are discarded and not taken 
into consideration while computing the overall shared 
reputation component . Based on shared 
reputation  and individual reputation of seller s 
i.e. , the equation to compute second moment 
 about an arbitrary point denoted by the individual 
reputation component  is illustrated in Eq. (1). 
                    (1)                                                         
4. All the opinions for which the difference 
, denote the opinion as 
fair/honest and the set of advisors as honest advisors 
represented by . All the opinions for which the 
difference , denote these 
opinions as unfair and the set of advisors as dis-honest 
advisors .  Now, filter out the opinions of dis-honest 
advisors  from the set of advice to be considered for 
aggregation.  
5. Find the weightage  of each advisor   for i = 1, 
2,..., n based on its past behaviour by using Eq. (2). 
                               (2)                                                               
In Eq. (2),  is constant in the range (0,1], and  
represents the consolidated value of various parameters 
of advisors‟ past behaviour as shown in Eq. (3). 
           (3)                              
Where  represents the percentage of Honest 
Past Opinions from the advisor and  is a constant in 
the range (0,1] that represents the effect of   
on advisors weightage. Further,  represents 
the number of Honest Past Opinions from the advisor 
and  is a constant in the range (0,1]  that represents its 
effect on advisors‟ weightage. Also,  represents the 
incentive of being a fair advisor with the initial value 
of . With each successive honest advice from a 
particular advisor, the value of  is incremented by a 
small factor say 0.01 to give greater incentive to a 
faithful advisor. The product of  and  
ensure that the effect of incentive provided to advisor 
for being honest changes dynamically and increases by 
a greater margin with each successive honest advice. 
The equation for %ofHPO is given below in Eq. (4). 
              (4)                                   
6. Find the aggregated shared reputation of the seller s i.e. 
 by using Eq. (5) below. 
                    (5)                                                          
7. Update the reputation   of each advisor bi., 
whose opinion was classified as honest i.e.  
using reinforcement learning as shown in Eq. (6). 
       (6)                                         
Further,                         (7)                                                            
Where  is the advisors‟ reputation increase factor and 
x represents the value of transaction for which the 
opinion about the target seller agent is sought from the 
advisor by the source buyer agent. This makes the 
amount of increase in the advisors‟ reputation to be 
truly dynamic as it is monotonically proportional to the 
value of transaction x. Hence, the amount of advisors‟ 
reputation enhanced for a large value transaction would 
be greater than its enhancement in case of a relatively 
small value transaction.  
8. Update the reputation of each dishonest advisor  
as shown below in Eq. (8). 
        (8)                                     
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Further, )                    (9)                                                       
Where  represents the advisors‟ reputation decrease 
factor,  is a constant in the range between 0 to 1, and 
 represents the penalty factor for decrease in 
reputation and  to emphasize that the penalty of 
being dishonest must always be at least equal to or 
greater than the corresponding reward for being honest. 
This is based on the convention that reputation is hard 
to build but easy to tear down. The actual value of  
can be decided by the domain experts. The process of 
decreasing the dishonest advisors‟ reputation is also 
dynamic as it is monotonically proportional to the 
value of a transaction based on the convention that 
dishonest behaviour in a relatively large value 
transaction is more devastating and hence must be 
discouraged to a greater extent than similar behaviour 
in a small value transaction.  
9. Finally, based on step 7 or step 8, for i=1,2,..,n, update 
the sets of reputed, non-reputed, dis-reputed and new 
advisors i.e. ,  ,  and  as: 
If  bi is not a reputed advisor, and ,  
  .                               (10)    
If bi is a reputed advisor, and  ,  
  .                               (11)                                    
If bi is not a dis-reputed advisor, and ,  
  .                               (12) 
If bi is not  non-reputed, and  ,  
 .                              (13)               
 Finally, if bi is a new advisor, and, if ,  
  .                        (14)   
As all participants in the reputation system are self 
interested, hence there must be some incentive for a buyer 
to participate in the opinion sharing process. This work 
provides incentives to an honest advisor by increasing its 
reputation i.e. trustworthiness and also by dynamically 
increasing the weight of its opinion with each successive 
honest advice. It is based on the convention that wrong 
advice is worse than no advice, as its purpose is to subvert 
the main goal of reputation systems by artificially 
manipulating the reputation of the target seller agent 
through collusion, to mislead the source buyer agent that is 
seeking opinion. Hence, this methodology provides for 
penalising the dishonest advisors by reciprocatively 
decrementing their reputation as advisors.  
Further, to ensure that there is always an availability of 
honest advisors, this model is based on the premise that a 
buyer must always respond to a request for an advice from 
any other buyer who belongs to its reputed advisors‟ list. 
This is based on the convention, that good behaviour in 
case of honest non competitive peers who engage in 
repeated transactions is a win-win game. This is mutually 
beneficial, as if buyer x always responds to a request from 
y, and in return y also responds to x‟s request for advice,  
then the need of seeking opinion from relatively unknown 
and potentially dishonest advisors is minimised.    
To summarize, the main functions of the proposed 
dynamic reputation sharing methodology with an intention 
to enhance trustworthiness of the system by filtering out 
dishonest opinions and by allocating reputation to 
advisors, are illustrated using a flowchart in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2  A  Dynamic Reputation Sharing Methodology 
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The proposed model is sensitive to the dynamically 
changing parameters of e-market, like the value of  
transaction and the past behaviour of advisors, with the  
purpose to encourage advisors who contribute to the 
trustworthiness of the reputation system and e-market 
environment by repeatedly providing honest opinions. 
4. Case Study 
To illustrate the application of the proposed model for 
sharing reputation of sellers among buyers in order to 
enable them to make an informed decision about selecting 
honest advice, a case study was conducted by simulating 
an electronic marketplace with eight participants as buyers 
and five as sellers, i.e. B = {bi     where i = 1...8}, set A B, 
and S = {sj   where j = 1…5}, where B is the set of buyers, 
A is the subset of buyers playing the role of advisors, and 
S is the set of sellers in the marketplace for good g. The 
proposed model was simulated in MATLAB and is 
illustrated ahead.  
A situation was investigated where buyer b2 requested for 
an opinion about the reputation of a seller s4 from other 
buyers, after purchasing the good g.  The buyers b1,  b3,  b4, 
b5 and b7, acting as advisors were known to buyer b2, 
although only four buyers were in its overall reputed list of 
advisors i.e.  = {bj where j = 1,3,5,7}. At time t+1 the 
source buyer agent b2 stored the number of honest past 
opinions and the percentage of honest past opinions as 
shown in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Reputation of Buyers as Advisors 
bi b1 b3 b4 b5 b7 
%OfHPO 76.92 82.3 46.8 79.4 90 
NoOfHPO 20 14 8 11 9 
Further,  = 0.38,  = 0.15, e = 1.01,  = 0.6,  = 
0.3,  = 0.95, = 2,   and, penalty factor  = 
1.5. Based on the source buyer agent b2’s request, the set 
of opinions received from other buyers who responded 
with their advice about the reputation  of seller s4 
and, the current reputation of different advisors  
being stored by the buyer b2 that is based on their past 
behaviour are depicted in Fig. 3 ahead. 
The opinion from advisor b4 is ignored by the source buyer 
agent b2 as b4‟s reputation as advisor i.e. ar_b4 = 0.31 is 
less than reputation threshold of = 0.38. The reputation 
component  reprsenting the target seller s4‟s 
reputation based on source buyer agent b2‟s individual 
experience was 0.389. 
 
Fig. 3 Shared opinion of seller s4’s reputation from different advisors, and 
current reputation of advisors in b2’s Memory  
Using Eq. (1), second moment m2 representing distance 
between the opinions by the set of reputed advisors and  
the individual experience of buyer b2 about the reputation 
of seller s4 was computed to be 0.0092. Also, using step 4, 
part II of the methodology, opinions for which the 
difference  were classified to 
be “Honest” and others as “Dishonest” using MATLAB as 
shown in Fig. 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4 Filtered opinion of Advisors‟ as Honest or Dishonest 
The value of  representing incentive for honest opinions 
for a  incremental value of 0.01 after each transaction is 
shown below in Table 2.  
Table 2: Value of  as incentive for honest opinions  
bi b1 b3 b7 
 1.2 1.14 1.09 
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Using Eq. (3), representing the consolidated value of the 
past behaviour of the advisors ( ), the weight of each 
reputed advisors‟ opinion ( ) was computed, and was  
found to be monotonically proportional to the past 
behaviour of various advisors i.e. the advisors with 
successively honest past behaviour were allocated higher 
weight as compared to others as shown in Fig. 5 below 
 
Fig. 5 Weight of advisors‟ opinion varies monotonically                        
w.r.t. consolidated value of their past behaviour ( ) 
Now, based on the newly computed weight of each advisor 
( ), the aggregated shared reputation of the seller s4 i.e. 
 was computed and represented as ar_others = 
0.3875 in MATLAB as shown in Fig. 6 below. Further, 
based on   Eq.  (7), the value of  was computed as: 
              (15) 
And, using Eq. (9), the value of  was computed as: 
 0.02663.     (16) 
Using Eq. (6) and Eq. (8), updated reputation of different 
advisors i.e.  was computed using MATLAB. 
The aggregated shared reputation „or_others‟ of seller s4, 
weights of  honest advisors and the updated reputation of 
different advisors is illustrated in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Aggregated Shared Reputation of seller  s4 and                    
Updated Reputation of Advisors 
Finally, the aggregated shared reputation component i.e. 
or_others equalling 0.3875 was communicated for its use 
in updating the overall reputation of seller s4 for reference 
in any future transactions by buyer b2 with seller s4. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper proposed a dynamic strategy for buyer agents 
to enable a buyer to make an informed decision of 
selecting honest advisors by filtering unfair opinions in 
order to generate an aggregated shared reputation 
component. The strategy provided an incentive to honest 
advisors by associating the concept of reputation with 
advisors using reinforcement learning with the purpose to 
improve the trustworthiness among participants in the e-
market environment.. The proposed model is relatively 
dynamic as it computes the weight of an advisors‟ opinion 
based on the changing parameters of e-market, like the 
number and percentage of honest past opinions. Further, 
the amount of change in advisors‟ reputation is based on 
the value of a transaction to emphasize that honest advice 
in a large value transaction is more important as compared 
to a similar advice in a relatively small value transaction. 
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